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Abstract
This paper considers the relation of education and of scientific
knowledge developed through R&D to productivity growth within a medium
time macroeconomic model that includes private and public physical,
human, and knowledge capital formation. It is unique in developing a
medium term model for determining productivity growth, and hence the
relative competitiveness of states and nations, that includes both
demand side and supply side effects, as well in incorporating total
investment.
Empirical results for the US and 14 other major OECD nations for 5
year time periods from 1950 through 1980 find stable growth of total
capital formation to be critical. Education as measured separately by
average educational attainment of the labor force, bachelors and more
advanced level graduates in the physical, life, and social sciences that
embody the new scientific developments bringing them to bear on production
more quickly are both found to be highly significant determinants of
productivity growth. Investment in physical capital is also highly
significant, but the R&D effort is less so, although R&D may be effective
largely as it is embodied through this investment in human and physical
capital. High utilization rates, as measured by full employment, and
lower relative initial productivity levels permitting transfer of technology,
are found to be the other highly significant sources of labor productivity
growth.

Sources of Productivity Growth in a Medium
Term Macroeconomic Model with Human Capital
Walter W. McMahon
This paper considers the relation of education and R&D to labor
productivity growth in the U.S. and other OECD nations within the con-
text of a macroeconomic model that includes both human capital and
stocks of knowledge.
Supply side policies have tended to emphasize physical capital
formation by private business firms, with less attention to investment
in education or to investment in new knowledge such as which that
occurs via non-defense R&D. Both include public investment, and edu-
cation also includes private investment by households as they save and
invest their time and other resources. These sources of investment
also affect productivity growth.
A macroeconomic model that incorporates the concept of total
capital as defined and measured for the U.S. by Kendrick (1976) will
be developed in this paper. The model is unique in including human
capital formation and knowledge capital formation through public and
private investment in education and in R&D within a medium term IS-LM
structural framework, as well as in relating these to the growth of
output on the supply side. Blinder and Solow (1973) were the first
to incorporate physical capital formation into a medium term macro-
economic model. But neither their work nor the extension of it by
Turnovsky (1977, pp. 127-158) to incorporate inflation and expecta-
tions allows the capital accumulation that does occur as part of
Turnovsky 1 s "intrinsic dynamics" to have any effect through a produc-
tion function on output from the supply side.
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The significance of incorporating total capital and productivity
growth in a medium term model is to extend and improve the con-
sistency of the concept of intrinsic dynamics by allowing capital
stock accumulation to affect output from the supply side rather than
limiting it to wealth effects on demand. The implication of too
narrow a view of saving and of capital deepening, if used to determine
supply side policies, could include actually reducing saving. and
investment in education and R&D below what it would otherwise be.
If the rates of return to education and to R&D are high relative
to the alternatives as they are found to be by Psacharopoulos (1981),
McMahon (1982), and Griliches (1983) respectively, reduced investment
in education and in R&D would be expected to contribute to reductions
in productivity growth in the future. Finally, the significance of
the concept of total capital is also apparent in the new science-
technology-information revolution and the structural shift away from
smokestack industries. Both Japan and Germany, for example, have
invested a larger percent of their GNP in non-defense R&D since 1960,
and Japan has maintained a higher rate of increase in its stock of
human capital than have almost all of the other OECD countries.
Part I of this paper develops a structural macroeconomic model
that incorporates the effects of education and R&D on productivity
growth. It focuses on a production function that contains physical
capital, human capital, and knowledge capital, all differentiated
with respect to time, and that attempts to control for demand side
influences by including unemployment as a measure of the influence
of slack demand and underutilization. This is necessary because
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underutilization, and particularly underutilization of human capital
in the form of labor hoarding by firms, contributes to lower produc-
tivity for each person on the average that remains employed in the
medium term. Other components of the demand-side are not estimated
empirically here. The model does provide for the fact that pro-
ductivity growth in the medium term can arise from demand pull forces,
so that the recovery of productivity growth need not necessarily be
supply-led.
Part II considers the empirical significance of these sources of
productivity growth using data for each five year period from 1955
through 1980 for the U.S. and 14 other OECD nations. Since a slowdown
in productivity growth occurred in all of these nations beginning in
1973, a somewhat broader perspective is offered on the sources of the
slowdown. But the primary focus is on the contribution of education,
R&D, and demand pull forces to productivity growth in the medium term.
I. The Medium Term Macroeconomic Model Incorporating
Total Capital
To consider the supply side and the capital deepening process as
distinguished from long run steady state solutions, the production
function will be the starting point. It will be followed by invest-
ment functions for human, physical, and knowledge capital, and this by
abbreviated reference to other components of an IS-LM type system.
The production function as well as the rest of the model with
which it is consistent will be expressed in terms of percentage rates
of change, all of which are represented by lower case notation, with
capital letters referring to the level of each variable. The reason
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is that the productivity growth and capital deepening, (as well as
inflation rates, rates of change in the money supply, and rates of
change in demand) which are the focus are all percentage rates of
change with respect to time. The underlying model is specified in
terms of levels, as is more customary. Most of the derivations that
then convert it to percentage rates of change are shown in the Appen-
dix.
The model also incorporates simplifying assumptions which are
essential in order to consider the interactions within the system.
All economic theory simplifies reality, but the simplifying assump-
tions seek to avoid doing violence to the essence of the phenomena
simplified.
The Production Function
Starting, therefore, with a Cobb-Douglas production function that
includes human capital and both embodied and disembodied stocks of
knowledge, taking the natural logs, and differentiating with respect
to time gives the growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (y) as a
function of the rate of growth of the various inputs. The rate of
growth of the number of persons employed (n) may then be subtracted
from both sides under the simplifying assumption of constant returns
to scale to determine the rate of growth of output per worker: (The
production function from which it can be derived is shown in the
Appendix.
)
(1) (y-n) = y U + Y
2
(Y/N)_
1
+ Y
3
(k+a-n) + Y
4
(h+a-n)
+ Y
5 (he+a-n) + y 6a + y ( e-n)
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Here:
(y-n) = labor productivity growth per worker, (rather than per hour,
for consistency with the rest of the model, is also close to
Denison's (1979, 1983) NIPPE),
U = percent underutilization of human capital,
H
(Y/N) , = the initial level of output per worker reflecting the costs
of technological leadership that deters those in the lead and
the advantages of backwardness for those adapting the tech-
nology developed by others,
(k+a-n) = the rate of physical capital formation (k) per worker (n)
,
(h+a-n) = the rate of human capital formation per worker,
(he-+-a-n)= the rate of increase in higher educational attainment (he)
per worker (n) , a mechanism for embodiment and dissemination
of the new technology,
a = the rate of increase in technical knowledge generated by
R&D, and
(e-n) = the rate of change in petroleum-energy use per worker.
Total Capital Deepening . Human capital deepening includes the
increased average educational attainment of the labor force per person
which would include the embodiment of new knowledge (h+a) that occurs
as the result of investment in education. It facilitates adaptability
to change and, when the education emphasizes creativity, also facili-
tates innovation, e.g., OECD (1982). Increased higher education also
embodies the new technology (he-fa) but at more advanced levels. It* is
measured here as the number of graduates in the physical sciences,
life sciences, social sciences, engineering, medicine, agriculture,
and business. administration as a percent of the labor force. It brings
the new technology to bear on production as the new graduates enter
the labor force, while also strengthening the research capability of
firms (e.g., Mansfield, 1983), all of which strengthens the effect of
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education on productivity growth. This effect from technology, and
the increased completion of two year degree programs at the Associate
and Masters' level, especially by women, are the main reasons for
postulating that some effects of human capital formation on produc-
tivity should be detectable within medium term 5-10 year periods. The
increase in the explanatory power of human capital formation as the
result of embodiment of the technology is directly analogous to the
stronger effects from the growth of physical capital formation as the
more recent vintages included in Gross Private Domestic Investment
embody the new technology, (k+a above), a well known affect previously
found for physical capital by Robert Solow (1960).
The measurement of each of these variables, anticipating the
empirical tests for the effects from each of these components of total
capital formation in Part II requires some further comments. The
general education component, increases in the average educational at-
tainment, measures an increased number of years of schooling primarily
at the primary and secondary levels. But it also indirectly measures
human capital formation on the job, which is included conceptually in
human capital formation, because of the close correlation between the
number of years of schooling and the amount of human capital formation
that occurs through experience and training on the job.
Technical higher education, just as with physical capital invest-
ment, is a gross investment concept in that new graduates include re-
placement of persons who retire and this replacement investment also
brings the new technologies to bear on production. As stressed by
Eliasson (1981), new technologies are defined more broadly here to
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include the more recent production management, marketing, and business
administration efficiencies as well as improvements in economic and
social organization, all of which can contribute to less private and
social waste and hence greater social efficiency. The embodiment of
the new technology occurs in part as the result of government and in-
dustry supported research, especially that conducted at universities,
since in the latter case there is a joint product of the new knowledge
as well as the embodiment of it in a constant flow of new students.
The more rapid dissemination of the new technologies, broadly
defined, among firms and countries is a separate important means by
which both general education and higher technical education increments
can contribute with lags to productivity growth. For example, Mansfield
(1983, p. 3) finds in a sample of 104 firms that a 10 percent increase
in the number of years of schooling of the company's president is
associated, after controlling for other factors, with a significant
increase in the probability that new innovations are adapted by the
firm. The importance of dissemination is also illustrated by the fact
that the productivity in best practice plants within each industry far
exceeds the productivity in the worst practice plants, e.g., Carlsson
(1980, pp. 15-30). So significant increases in productivity can occur
merely through dissemination among firms, facilitated by the presence
of more highly trained people. It can also occur across nations— to
measure this, the initial productivity level variable (Y/N) is used
above to measure Maddison's (1982) "advantages of backwardness."
To measure disembodied technical progress, a in Eq. (1) above,
research and development investment is used as a more explicit index
of additions to the stock of knowledge. The measure is confined to
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non-defense R&D, not because defense research does not have spillover
effects, but because research and development effort designed
specifically to contribute to efficiency in the non-defense parts of
the economy is more likely to have effects on productivity growth than
research not so designed. The effects of disembodied R&D on produc-
tivity are much debated, e.g., National Science Foundation (1981, pp.
13-16). But they are likely to operate with longer lags, to be
related to patenting activity, e.g., Griliches (1983), and to be
important to sustaining the technological leadership in the leading
firms and leading countries. Less developed nations may be able to
adopt existing technologies with smaller R&D efforts, and yet to enjoy
significant productivity gains. So the expected direction of this ef-
fect is not clear, as it is with all of the other effects, when the
regression includes the follower-countries (or follower-firms). A
positive relation would be expected between R&D effort and productivity
growth in the U.S. taken alone, but there could even be a negative
relation between the smaller R&D efforts in the follower countries and
their faster productivity growth as they embody in human and physical
capital the fruits of the R&D efforts of others.
The effect of physical capital formation (k+a) on productivity
growth is well known, and included in Eq. (1). Since the objective
is to focus on the net effects from education and R&D on productivity,
this serves to control for the simultaneous effects from physical
capital formation. But to measure both physical capital investment
and investment in R&D in international data as the percentage change
in the respective stocks of capital goods and of knowledge however is
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impossible. Kendrick's (1976) measures of the latter are available
for the U.S. but not the other OECD countries. A useful solution,
which also turns out to have a logical relation to the linear addi-
tivity of the levels of investment on the demand side, is to scale the
data for investment in physical capital and in R&D by expressing them
as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product of each country.
Underutilization . As aggregate demand falls off, raw labor be-
comes unemployed. But the most skilled workers and management personnel
essential to the survival of the firm tend to be retained. As the
volume of output falls far below capacity, this human capital tends to
be underutilized. Hence the productivity per person employed, since
these workers are still counted as employed, tends to fall sharply in
most recession periods. The workers retained are likely to be those
with more human capital who are the more productive workers—but the
underutilization of all of the overhead human capital results in lower
output per worker for all of those who remain employed. The result of
this effect, which is also a result of having introduced human capital
into the model, is that rising productivity in the medium term is
partially due to reduced underutilization and hence to demand-pull
forces.
With respect to measurement, there is no direct measure of the
lack of full human capital capacity utilization within firms. But the
unemployment rate of all labor as adjusted by the OECD to allow for
some international differences in measurement should be a good proxy,
since both phenomena are largely the result of slack demand.
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The final term in Eq. (1) provides for the energy shQcks occurring
in 1973 and in 1979 as crude oil prices, and all the energy sources
that depend on them, rose dramatically. The variable measuring the
rate of change in the availability of cheap energy per worker, (e-n)
,
is measured as the percentage change in net oil imports plus domesti-
cally produced and consumed oil per person employed.
Total Investment
Total investment, including investment in education and in R&D, is
stimulated in turn by more rapid growth of income per person employed.
The investment demand functions incorporating this feed-back effect are
shown below for gross investment in physical capital (k+a) , investment
in general education (h+a) , investment in technical higher education
(he+a) , and investment to increase the stock of knowledge via R&D, (a):
(2) (k+a-n) =
1
(y-n) +
2
(r-p) + 0^ + Q
(3) (h+a-n) = 6
1
(y-n) + 6
2
(g*-n) + 6
Q
(4) (he+a-n) = e^y-n) + e
2
(gHE
"n) + e
Q
(5) a = v
1
(y-n) + v
2
(r-p) + v^ + v
Q
Variables not already defined under Eq. (1) above are:
(r-p) = the rate of change in the real rate of interest,
gn
= government expenditure on education as a percent of GDP, a
policy variable,
*
g = government expenditure on higher education as a percent of
GDP, a policy variable,
g = government expenditure on research and development done by
universities and firms, also a policy variable.
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In the last analysis, final decisions to invest or not invest
in human capital formation are made primarily by households who invest
their time and other resources, but with "price" incentives provided by
government subsidies as in Eqs. (3) and (4) through low public school
tuition and other types of financial help. Analysis of microeconomic
data reveals that the amount of schooling planned and undertaken by
those from middle and lower income families depends heavily on family
disposable income per person (e.g.
,
(y-n) above)
,
given imperfect
capital markets, but also on public financial support of education,
including that for tuition at all levels and for student loans and
grants, (i.e., g and g above); see McMahon (1983)). The latter areH HL
policy variables that influence the effective price of education to
households, and hence the private rates of return. The result of
these public loan, subsidy, and grant programs is broader access to
education and more schooling undertaken by the economically marginal
groups, plus a stimulus to additional household saving from student
time and family foregone earnings to support the investment that
otherwise would not occur.
Structural improvements in the educational system, if any, (e.g.,
strengthened high school requirements in science, social science,
mathematics, and English, higher pay for these teachers, a longer
school day, and a longer school year as called for in the 1983 Presi-
dential Commission Report entitled A Nation At Risk ) are likely to
require more public and more private resources if they are to occur.
But the analysis does not depend on any structural reform occurring.
It focuses instead the relation of family and public sources of
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financial support to the number of years of education attained. Once
this is determined by equations (3) and (4) above, (based on McMahon
(1983)) it then is related directly to productivity and income growth
in equation (1).
Joint Determination with the Demand-Side
The focus of the empirical estimation in Part II is on the parts
of the model already presented above—i.e., the relation of total
investment to productivity growth, plus the equilibrium condition with
aggregate demand. Table 1 presents the demand side, Eq. (6), and flow
equilibrium condition, Eq. (7), in order to explain the underutiliza-
tion and reduced investment which are also part of the medium term.
Table 1 also suggests how the productivity and investment demand
components (Eqs. 1-6) can be viewed as part of a consistent overall
model.
The linearity in percentage rates of change with respect to time
is straightforward on the supply side because the underlying produc-
tion function and the wage and price equations can best be regarded as
linear in the logs. But on the demand side problems arise, because
the aggregate demand components, given GNP definitions, must be
regarded as additive in terras of levels, and not in terras of their
logs. The solution however, turns out to also be convenient for our
purposes. It is to first define Consumption as net of household
investment in education, and Gross Private Domestic Investment as
net of Investment in R&D, then to subtract aggregate demand expressed
in terms of levels and lagged one period from itself. Finally divide
by Y
_i to obtain:
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(6a)
Y~Y
-i
_
c'c
-i
,
^-i
,
hrh-i
,
^e^he-i
,
G
*-
G
-i
,
F~F
-1
Co
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
-1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
llecting the lagged terms like C -,/Y, on the right yields:
Y"Y
-1
(6b) — = C/Y_
1
+ I/Y_
1
+ I
H
/Y_
1
+ lyg/Y.-L + G*/Y_ 1 + F/Y_ 1
-Y /Y1
d-l/ d-1
This is identical to Equation 6 in Table 1 when re-expressed in the
lower case notation defined there. G*, T*, and F are treated as
exogenous (they do not appear in Eq . (1) directly), and n has been
subtracted form both sides to get Eq . (6). The investment/ income
ratios are not exactly rates of change over time in each capital
stock, but they are rates of capital formation relative to a base
income level. This is convenient because it is what is required for a
logically consistent solution to the macroeconomic model and because
it scales the investment components for each of the 15 countries
considered in Part II by the Gross Domestic Product of that country.
The data on GDP are available for all countries, whereas the data on
these capital stocks are not.
The Wage-Price and Monetary Sectors
The inflation rate is determined by relatively standard Phillips-
type wage and price equations. They contain demand-pull, core infla-
tion rate, and supply-shock elements. They represent something short
of the long run rational expectations polar case where it = p, full
pass-through of expectations into wages and prices, forecast errors
and shocks with means of zero, and hence a Phillips curve that is
vertical. Instead, the model focuses on the medium terra within which
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Table 1
A Structural Interpretation of Sources of Medium-Term
Productivity Growth
Productivity Growth :
(1) (y-n) = y-jUg + Y
2
(Y/N)_
1
+ Y
3
(k+a-n) + Y 4 (h+a-n)
+ Y
5
(he+a-n) + y
6
* + Y
y
(e-n) y
±
< 0, Y
2
<
Total Investment :
(2) (k+a-n) = G^y-n) - G^r-p) + 0^ + Q Qi (k+a) = I/Y_ 1
(3) (h+a-n) = 6
1
(y-n) + «S
2
(g*-n) + 5Q , (h+a)
= IjAY^. g^ = VY-i
JL J- ^
(4) (he+a-n) = e^y-n) + e
2
(g
HE;
-n) + e
Q ,
(he+a) = I
H£
/Y_
1 , g^ = G^/Y
(5) a = v
1
(y-n) + v
2
(r-p) + v
3
(s*" n) + V a = VY-1' gA = GA/Y-1
Aggregate Demand (Flow Equilibrium) and Fiscal Policy :
(6) (y-n) = (c+a) + (k+a-n) + (h+a-n) + (he+a-n) + a + g* + T - l+2n
c+a = C/Y.r
g* = (G* + G^ + G* + G* + G*)/Y_r f = T/T.j
(7) c+a - XQ
+ X
x
yD
(8) yD
= (l+y)(Y.
1
/Y
D_ 1
) - T*/Y
D_ 1
+ T*/Y
D_1
Inflation Rate :
(9) p = 3^ + 3 2w + 3 3 (y-n) + 4 pe 3 X > 0, 3 2 > 0, 3 3 < 0, 3 4 >
(10) w = a U + a ir + a
3
(y-n) a^ > 0, a
?
> 0, <*
3
> 0, $
3
t ' 'C'
2
a
3
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(11) TT = XP±V + lj;
2p_ 1
ft
(12) U
R
= U
K
= U = N/N
p
= Y(} (l+y)Y_
1
(13) y = (y-n) + (1/N_
1
)N_
1
Monetary Sector : (Restrictive Demand Management In Reaction to
Inflation) :
k *
(14) m - K.y + <_p + k-U • K. < 1, < >
s. 1 p 2 3 2 3
(15) m
d
= u-^y + M
2
(r-p) + m tt n <
(16) m = m = m,
s d
Variables are defined in the text except for:
Asterisk (*) symbolizes policy determined expenditure (g*) and tax (t*) rates.
p = the inflation rate.
w = the rate of increase in money wages.
U = percent underutilization of raw labor (one minus the percent unemployed)
,
of human capital (some of which is hoarded by firms, Uy) , and of physical
capital (Uk = one minus the percent excess capacity) , assumed to be equal
as a simplifying assumption
G = government investment in human capital (G^) , in higher education (G^g) , in
R&D performed by universities and firms (G^) , in physical capital (G^) , and
government support of consumption (G c ).
I = household investment in education, which is netted from Personal
Consumption Expenditure (C) and is assumed to be positively related to
(h+a) as a simplifying assumption,
I. = investment in R&D which affects a.
A
y percent rate of change in real Gross Domestic Product during the medium
term, (5-10 year period), with y = (Y-Y_i)/Y_i.
n = percent rate of change in employment.
y = percent rate of change in real disposable income.
r = the nominal rate of interest.
it = the rate of change in the expected inflation rate.
T = total tax receipts, R = transfer payments.
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prices and wages may not be able to fully adapt (i.e., a and 3 are
not necessarily equal to unity, and not all markets clear). In this
medium term, expectations adapt partially to changes in the inflation
rate (Eq. 11).
The monetary sector consists of an expectation augmented demand
for money function of a type that has been used by Friedman, plus a
money supply reaction function. On the demand side, additional un-
certainty in interest rate outcomes has arisen as structural changes
have created larger money market fund balances and other forms of near
money—but rather than add an additional term (e.g. , a) we have chosen
to leave this with the residuals. On the supply side, Black (1981)
has estimated reaction functions of this type for ten OECD countries,
after controlling for foreign exchange reserves. With the discount
rate as the dependent variable, for example, he finds both an expected
restrictive monetary policy reaction to higher inflation rates in
these countries, and easier money and credit terms following higher
unemployment rates in the period 1963 to 1980 in Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. (ibid, pp.
35-37). In the U.S. the tightening in mid-1980 when the inflation
rate was high and the abandonment of the 2l/2%-5l/2% monetarist rule in
August 1982 as it fell and unemployment rose are perhaps other ex-
amples of this.
One Period Equilibrium Solutions to the Model
Since the model as a whole is linear in the rates of change as
defined above, it can be solved for a one period equilibrium relevant
to the approximately five year time span in which the model is
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expressed. That is, the solution produces a value for each of the 15
endogenous rates of change and for average utilization. For this pur-
pose the lagged endogenous variables are treated as predetermined, and
hence as parameters.
The solution produces a steady state rate of growth of productivity
(at fixed values of the exogenous variables and lagged endogenous
variables) that is non-zero within any given 5 to 10 year period. It
is an equilibrium rate in the sense that the flow equilibrium and
monetary equlibrium conditions are enforced (Eqs. 6 and 16). Utiliza-
tion rates can remain below full capacity on the average for any given
5 to 10 year period, so that a failure to reach full recovery can
adversely affect both productivity growth directly and investment
(Eqs. 1 and 2). In contrast to the Blinder-Solow (1973) long run
steady state solution however, net saving and capital deepening
continue to occur. This is also an extension of Turnovsky's (1977)
intrinsic dynamics, since human as well as physical capital deepening
in the medium term contributes through the production function both to
embodiment of the new technology and to productivity growth.
II. Empirical Estimates of the Productivitv Growth
t
and Investment Functions
To offer an intuitive illustration of the operation of the model,
following higher inflation rates in 1973-74 and 1979-80 that occurred
Q
at the time of the oil price shocks p in Eq. (9) which were initially
accommodated by the money supply, restrictive monetary policies were
employed by most of the 15 major OECD countries, (i.e., < < 1 in
Eq. 14). The result was higher interest rates (Eqs. 14-16), reduced
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investment (Eq. 2), and reduced aggregate demand (Eq. 6). The effect
of this on productivity growth in threefold. First, the underutili-
zation that accompanies reduced aggregate demand slows productivity
growth directly as some human capital remains employed but under-
utilized. Second, slowed physical capital formation lowers produc-
tivity growth because of its supply-side effects (Eq. 1). Third,
slower income growth reduces human capital and knowledge capital
formation (Eqs. 3-5), with delayed effects on productivity growth (via
Eq. 1). As recovery begins, the reverse process occurs.
The regressions shown in Table 2 are one-stage least squares esti-
mates of Equation (1). They are a first approximation to explaining
the sources of productivity growth in the period from 19 55 through
1980 in the major OECD nations, including the U.S.
For the 15 nations in the regression at the top, 5 year periods
from 1955 through 1980 for each nation yield 75 observations, which
drops back to 45 when the more stable growth period from 1955-70 is
considered, eliminating the energy shocks and productivity slowdown
that characterized the more unstable 1971-1980 period (e.g., McMahon
(1981)). At the bottom of Table 2, a measure of total public and
private R&D effort is available for only the 5 largest nations, so the
number of available observations drops back to 15 for 1955-70 or to
25 for the 1955-80 period as a whole.
Human Capital Formation
The significance of human capital formation to productivity growth
revealed here is somewhat similar to that found by Denison (1983),
Schultz (1983), and Kendrick (1980).
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When human capital formation per worker as measured by increased
average educational attainment of the working age population (h+a-n)
is introduced as shown in Table 2, it always turns out to have the ex-
pected positive sign. It is a more significant factor explaining pro-
ductivity growth in the relatively stable period from 1955 to 1970 for
both the 15 nations (at the top of Table 1) and the 5 largest nations
(at the bottom), although it continues to have a positive relation to
productivity growth when the 1970-1980 period is included.
When this measure of schooling which reflects basic literacy in
mathematics, language, and science is augmented with a measure of the
number of newly trained physical scientists, social scientists,
engineers, management personnel, and agricultural specialists as a
percent of the labor force in each country, (he+a-n) , this higher tech-
nical education variable has the expected positive sign and is also
significant at the .05 level.
However, Higher Technical Education (he+a-n) also allows the
follower country to capitalize on the "advantages of backwardness" by
adapting and using the new technologies. So it is picked up indirectly
by the initial productivity level term (Y/N) as a proxy as "backward-
ness" is capitalized on. There are many LDC ' s that have not equaled
the growth record of Japan and Israel, for example. In these two
countries, large initial stocks of human capital and higher rates of
growth in education and health levels have undoubtedly made it easier
for them to adopt and adapt western technology. The level of educa-
tional attainment in Japan was not only high initially, but the rate
of increase at all levels, and especially in advanced technical areas,
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has been considerably higher than that in the U.S. or the UK since
1950. Importing high technology capital goods undoubtedly transmits
some kinds of new technology, (e.g., Maddison, 1979), but there are
still significant steps requiring trained people before most of these
capital goods and especially the more intangible kinds of scientific
findings (e.g. , uses of hybrids in agriculture) can be adapted by
development efforts within firms and brought to bear on production.
This combined effect of general education, technical education,
and the advantages of backwardness is consistent with what is being
found in an increasing number of studies of productivity growth in the
less developed countries as well. To cite only one example, there is
an interesting recent study by Yamada and Ruttan (1980, p. 559) of the
sources of productivity growth in agriculture in 41 developed and
developing countries. They find that the number of graduates of agri-
cultural colleges per person employed in agriculture (which helps to
facilitate the dissemination of new technology but also the mobility
out of lower productivity agriculture into agribusiness) , supplemented
by the average educational attainment of persons in agriculture,
accounts for 30-32 percent of the productivity differences in agri-
culture within both developed and less developed countries.
This is not to suggest that reduced human capital formation has
as yet been more than a minor source of the slowdown since 1973 in
growth per capita. The slowdown has been experienced by all of the
major OECD nations, as can be seen at the top of Table 2. This is
largely because investment in education is not as sensitive to
restrictive monetary policies as is physical capital investment.
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Table 2
Growth in Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable ; Productivity Change Over 5 Year Period (y-n) for Each Country;
(y-n)
FIFTEEN OECD NATIONS
1955-1970 1955-1980 1955-1970
Independent Variables : Coef
.
t-stat. Coef
.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Underutilization (Av. U) -1.23 -1.52 -1.50 -2.60 -.91 -1.27
Initial Productivity (Y/N) -11.23 -2.62 -10.70 -3.10 -10.59 -3.22
Physical Capital Deepening
(Av. I/Y_
1
-n) - .81 3.38 .67 3.63 1.08 7.92
Hunan Capital Deepening
(h-n) .05 2.02 .02 1.22 .07 2.91
Higher Technical Education
(he+a-n) .03 2.75
Energy Change per Worker (e-n) .00 .38 .01 1.17 .002 .74
Constant (eg., a) .14 1.70 .16 2.32
Number of Observations = 45 75 45
R2 = .57 .54 .61
FIVE LARGEST OECD NATIONS:
1955-1970 1970-1980
Independent Variables : Coef . t-statistic Coef . t-statistic
Underutilization (Av. U) -3.21 -1.70 -4.48 -11.56
Change in Underutilization (\x) -3.67 -3.68
Initial Productivity (Y/N) -6.76 -1.35 12.74 5.82
Physical Capital Deepening
(k-n) = (Av. I/Y_
1
-n) 1.01 3.45 .21 .81
Human Capital Deepening
(h-n) .32 6.41 .08 3.71
R&D Knowledge Formation
a = (R&D) /Y -.05 -1.23 .04 1.42
Energy Change per Worker
(e-n) .002 .46 .001 .03
Number of Observations = 15 10
R2 = .97 .99
Simple Correlation, (y-n)
with (R&D)_
1
/Y_
1
.16 .51
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Relatively less human capital is financed with credit, or sensitive to
changes in credit terras. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that
there may be a greater reduction in the rate of effective human
capital formation than is revealed by the figures. For example, the
quality of education has fallen in the U.S. in some respects since
the late 1960's as evidenced by the reduced high school requirements
mentioned earlier for courses in math, science, and social science,
and the falling math, science, and verbal scores on college admission
and graduate record examinations. A weakening in college curricular
requirements occurred also in the U.S. as well as in Japan and
elsewhere at the time of the campus unrest of the late 1960 ? s that has
not been fully reversed. Furthermore, human capital formation in the
form of on-the-job training has been reduced for those unemployed
during the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Public support per pupil for
education has been cut in real terras by Federal and state governments
in the U.S. in the period from 1979 through 1983. This is likely to
have adverse effects on productivity growth in 1985 and beyond.
The obsolescence of energy-intensive physical capital investment
(the Baily effect) slowing productivity growth since 1973 is not
strictly reversible in that the same kinds of energy-intensive
investment cannot merely be resumed. More attention needs to be paid
to the less energy-intensive sources of productivity growth such as
human and knowledge capital formation, as well as to adaptation of
technology developed by others.
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Advances in Knowledge Through R&D
A larger civilian total public and private R&D effort in the U.S.
might be expected to lead to some productivity growth directly. But
such an effect proves difficult to detect. The lags are likely to be
somewhat longer than for human capital deepening which aids dissemi-
nation. The contribution of R&D efforts is also limited somewhat by
the fact that scientific discoveries are communicated among the
leading countries (externalities) and by the Rosenberg (1976) effect
which causes many of the costs of failed research and innovation, and
hence of diminishing returns to R.&D, to be borne by the leading
countries
.
In Table 2, the R&D effort appears explicitly only in the
regressions for the five largest OECD nations. This is because data
is available on total public and private non-defense R&D only for
these nations, and not for the other 11. (Source N.S.F., 1981).
However, data on public support for non-defense R&D were obtained from
the science policy branch at NSF for 11 of these nations. But when
included in regressions the results were not much different than those
for the public plus private civilian R&D efforts of the five largest
nations that are shown at the bottom of Table 2. Above and beyond the
technology embodied in human and physical capital formation, the
additional statistical contribution of R&D prior to 1970 was negative
but not significant. After 1970, those countries that had engaged in
larger R&D efforts earlier (R&D effort is lagged 5 years) did much
better in sustaining their productivity growth after the slowdown began,
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Some additional insight is offered by the new data in Table 3 on
Government R&D by Major Objective which has recently been collected
and made available by Rolf Piekarz and Eleanor Thomas (1983). This is
so since some types of R&D may reasonably be viewed as more relevant
to productivity growth than other types. For example, Japan's much
larger investment as a percent of its GDP for adaptation of western
technology relevant to agricultural productivity, industrial produc-
tivity, and energy shown in Table 3, as well as its much smaller total
public defense R&D effort relative to that in the U.S. and U.K., could
help to partially explain slower growth in the U.S. and U.K. as well
as the shift of technological leadership to Japan in an increasing
number of product lines. The Rosenberg (1976) effect has the poten-
tial of helping to explain the slower growth in the U.S., but not the
shift of technological leadership in some lines to Japan. The expla-
nation therefore needs to be augmented with the effects of investment
in new advances in knowledge, a part of total capital. Germany's non-
defense R&D effort has been even more dramatic than that in Japan,
both of which have considerably exceeded that in the U.S. and the U.K.
since 1965 (see Table 3). It may well be fruitful to extend the NSF
data to measure those types of R&D expected to be more relevant to
productivity growth over the entire 1955-1980 period so that the
effect of the composition of the R&D effort could be tested more
systematically in regressions.
Some will argue that new weapons systems and space exploration
have spillover effects on productivity growth—and here the U.S.
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Table 3
Growth Rates and Composition of R&D Expenditure
Countries Ranked from Fastest (left) to Slowest (right)
Pre-Energy-Shock Growth
JAPAN GERMANY FRANCE SWEDEN U.S. U.K.
Growth Rate Per Capita:
•
1966-1973 9.5% 3.9% 4.9% 3.2% 2.9% 2.5%
1974-1980 1.9 2.1 2.3 .9 1.3 .7
Non-Defense Govt. R&D
Plus Pvt. R&D As a
Percent of GDP:
1965 1.53% 1.53% 2.01% n.a. 1.33% 1.49%
1975 1.89 2.19 1.80 n.a. 1.50 1.39
Government R&D by
Major Objective:
Defense 5% 19% 36% 33% 49% 61%
Industrial Productivity 13 15 14 3 .4 10
Agricultural
Productivity 30 3 4 3 2 5
Energy 19 21 9 12 10 8
Health 7 ro 5 11 12 3
Advancement of
Knowledge 9 15 5 4 4
Other (e.g., Space,
Telecommunication,
Environment) 25 27 17 26 23 9.2
Sources : Non-Defense R&D from Science Indicators
,
N.S.F., p. 212
Government R&D by Objective is net of general university
funding, and from Piekarz et al. (1983, Table 10).
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clearly leads. But it is a reasonable hypothesis that those com-
ponents of R&D directly oriented to improving economic efficiency and
productivity or to expanding basic knowledge are likely to have a
larger impact on productivity growth than those that are not—see
Gilpin (1975) and NSF (1981, p. 9). Defense research also competes
for scarce scientific research personnel. " But in addition to defense,
the United States devotes a larger fraction of its research dollars to
health than anywhere else. There are monetary returns to health
research in the form of less illness that improves productivity and
non-monetary returns that yield a longer and better quality of life.
But no imputations are made for the latter in the measures of GNP, and
hence no contribution to productivity growth for much health research
is revealed.
There is other empirical evidence of shifts in technological
leadership away from the U.S. The increasing number of U.S. patents
secured by foreign inventors, for example, and the decline since about
1967 in the number of patents secured by American inventors (NSF,
1981, p. 110) may also be related to the smaller nondefense R&D
effort in the U.S., one implication of Griliches' (1983) findings
that R&D effort and potenting activity are closely related. This
smaller total public plus private R&D effort has been due largely to
the decline in Federal support for non-defense R&D. This is because
R.&D by private industry continued to grow slowly in real terms, in
spite of the lower profits during the 1975 and 1982 recessions (NSF,
1981, p. 75).
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Utilization and Demand-Led Sources of Productivity Growth
It is necessary to control for underutilization since slack
demand, reduced output, and the resulting excess capacity in the human
capital stock retained by firms contributes to demand-induced slowdown
in productivity growth. The consistently negative signs in Table 2
for the 1955-80 period as a whole, as well as for sub-periods, for the
underutilization created by slack demand as measured by the average
level of unemployment during the 5-year period (Av. U by Okun's
law, and after adjustment of unemployment rates by the OECD for dif-
ferences in measurement among countries) is consistent with this
hypothesis. The result is an implication of having introduced human
capital into the model, but is also consistent with Oi ' s (1962)
earlier work on labor as a fixed factor.
Beyond this however, the change in productivity which is our
dependent variable starts to become positive right after the trough of
each recession even though the level of output per man remains
low—witness the recovery of productivity growth in 1975-11 and in
late 1982 for example. So the change in underutilization has been
introduced in one of the regressions to test for, and control for,
this effect. The result shown ir> Table 2 is a negative sign for a
coefficient that is highly significant. This result for both the
changes in and level of underutilization is consistent with the
hypothesis that a significant portion of the recovery in medium term
productivity growth in the major OECD nations is demand-led.
Physical capital formation per worker has a consistently positive
and significant relation to productivity growth in Table 2, as.
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expected. It had a weaker effect in the 1970-80 period, in part per-
haps because of the Baily effect from the 1973 and 1979 energy shocks
causing obsolescence of existing capital so that replacement invest-
ment was substituted for investment that might otherwise have added
to productivity growth. A second factor must be mentioned since it
affects the analysis. It is that in the U.S. a much larger wave of
new workers was entering the labor force from 1970-1980 due to the
wave of post WWII births which was not matched by comparable increases
in France, Germany, Japan or the U.K. where total employment remained
stable in this period. For any given rate of investment in physical
or human capital, this growth in the labor force contributed to lower
capital formation per worker
,
thereby limiting capital deepening in
the U.S. with adverse effects on productivity growth. The future
effect of this demographic factor as college enrollments and labor
force growth rates decline from 1984-94 should be adverse for aggre-
gate growth rates, but positive for productivity growth per worker,
since it is easier for any given level of capital formation to achieve
greater capital deepening per person employed.
A Structural Interpretation of Productivity Growth
Although this paper is limited in its empirical aspects to the
productivity growth equation (it is already too long), the theoretical
contribution in Part I make it clear that productivity growth is being
interpreted as part of a structural process that interacts with the
rest of the system. Preliminary two stage least squares simultaneous
equation estimates of equations (1-8) in Table 1 which will not be
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reported in detail here reveal that the signs of all of the coeffi-
cients in the productivity growth equation remain identical to those
shown for the 15 OECD nations for 19 55-70 in the last column of
Table 2 above. The absolute size of the coefficients also remain
approximately the same. The t-statistic for the "higher technical
education" variable drops below the .05 level, but the remaining t-
statistics remain apparently the same. The per capita income growth
is very significantly related to all components of investment-demand
in the demand equations (1-5 in Table 1). The relative price terms
remain insignificant in these preliminary runs, but there is some
question as to whether or not they should be measured in per-capita
terms as shown in Table 1.
Larger GDP per person employed clearly feeds back and leads to
increased total capital formation in the medium term (the modified
accelerator effect in Eqs. 2-5 in Table 1), as well as some growth of
demand Eq . 6). The estimation of Equations 1-8 by simultaneous
equation methods now underway will be followed by dynamic solutions by
simulation techniques that include the moderating effect of produc-
tivity on inflation (assuming < -6
?
a 7 in Eqs. 9 and 10) and that
go beyond the one-period (5 year) solution considered in Part I.
Conclusion
In conclusion, to summarize the sources of labor productivity
growth in the medium term they are first, the demand-led higher utili-
zation rates and higher physical capital investment associated with
recovery from recessions. Second, an important source of labor pro-
ductivity growth, (but not of the 1973-82 slowdown) , is human capital
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formation. Its effects are revealed in three ways—through increased
overall average educational attainment, among other things increasing
the "ability to deal with disequilibria" (Schultz, 1975), through
advanced technical education that brings the new technology and
research to bear on production, and through the ability it conveys to
capitalize on the "advantages of backwardness" (Maddison 1982).
This analysis has attempted to control for the effects of energy
shocks, both by integrating them into the logic of the analysis and by
introducing the rate of growth of energy use per worker as a variable
in the productivity growth equation. What is normally thought to be
another major source of productivity growth—disembodied technical
progress, as measured here by public and private investment in R&D as
a percent of GDP—did not stand alone as an independent and signifi-
cant influence in the analysis of data for the 15 OECD nations.
Perhaps this is because its effect is already picked up by the new
human capital formation and new and replacement investment in
physical capital that together embody the technology and bring it to
bear on production
—
plus the fact that the lags are longer than the
lags in the permitted by the data, especially for the disembodied
components of total capital formation.
As an issue in supply side economics, the debate is likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future on what is the appropriate mix between
a mere quantitative expansion of the educational system and improve-
ments in the quality of the services which it provides. But produc-
tivity growth could suffer if such a debate were allowed to obscure
the contribution of both
—
quantity and quality—and the resources
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required for each. Similarly, the most recent Economic Report of the
President (1983, p. 77) mentions that "another major source of produc-
tivity growth in investment in education and training that promotes
the accumulation of valuable human capital." It then goes on to "...
focus on non-residential plant and equipment investment," which is
also relevant, but not the whole story.
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Appendix
The sources of productivity growth given by equation (1) in the
text may be derived from the following production function:
YlV VY/N)t Y ? YA Y S Y * Y 7
(la) Y = e L * e * Ny(\K) j (AjjH) (A^E) °A °E
Terms not already defined above under equation (1) are:
Y = real GDP, e = base of natural logs,
N = employment of raw labor,
A = the stock of knowledge, embodied in physical capital through
replacement (and net new) investment (K,) , in human capital
through education and on-the-job training (A^), and dis-
embodied new research discoveries (A).
E = petroleum-energy inputs
Taking the logs:
(lb) £nY = Y,U«t + yAY/N)t + yZnN + Y-UnA+ZnK) +
Y,UnA + ZnH) + y UnA + £nHE) y^nA + Y^nE
Differentiating with respect to time, and using simpler lower case
notation for percentage rates of change gives:
(lc) y = YjUy + Y 2 (Y/N) + yn + Y 3 (a-Hc) + Y 4 (a+h) + Y 5 (a+he) + Y &a + y ? e
Assuming constant returns to scale among the inputs,
(Id) y = 1 - y„ - y. - Yc ~ Y c ~ Y 7 > n can be Subtracted from both3 4 ^> o /
sides.
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(1) (y-n) = YjU + Y
2
(Y/N) + y 3 (kta-n) + y 4 (hta-n) + Y 5 (he+a-n)
+ Y
&
a + Yy(e-n)
,
the same determinants of the rate of growth in labor productivity
shown in equation (1) in the text.
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